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THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TEXAS AND




Oil and gas are natural resources which cannot be replaced,
and the power of the state to impose reasonable regulations to
prevent waste in the production, handling, and marketing thereof,
is undoubted.'
Oil does not produce itself. Crude oil, as it exists at the sur-
face, possesses no energy with which to expel itself from the pores
of a rock. It is necessary that crude oil be associated with an
energy source before it can be moved into the bottom of a well
and raised to the surface of the earth. The two chief sources of
energy found in most petroleum reservoirs are gas expansion and
water encroachment.
2
One of the main problems of conservation is to apply remedies
or measures to maintain, as far as possible, reservoir energy.
Failure to do so, leaves a greater part of the oil in formation, for
which there is no recoveryA Other ways from which waste may
result are evaporation, seepage, fire, damage to underground for-
mations due to improper methods, premature abandonment of
stripper wells, loss of gas to the air by flaring, and an unwilling-
ness on the part of the companies to trade information. Most of the
Commission's regulations are directed to the prevention of physical
waste, e.g., open pit storage of oil, damage to mineral deposits,
pollution and surface damage, open flows and control of wild wells,
gas-oil ratios, and many more.
4
The main controversy about objectives of regulation concerns
the extent to which proration, i.e., the assignment to each well of
a rate of flow less than its capacity, is attributable to conservation
motives, and the extent to which it is designed to maintain prices.
The title of one of the many books on the subject, aptly puts the
question: "Oil. Stabilization or Conservation?" It seems apparent
that proration has helped to maintain the price of oil.
THE COMMISSIONS AND THEIR STAFFS
The Railroad Commission of Texas was created in 1891 by
constitutional amendment. It is composed of three members with
six-year overlapping terms, at first appointed by the Governor, but
since the Constitutional Amendment of 1894, elected by the people.
tStudent, University of Denver College of Law.
'Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation (Okla.) 51 Fed. 2d 823 (1931).
'Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Oil and Gas Production.
'Some of the oil may be produced by secondary recovery methods.




The chairmanship is rotated in such a way that each com-
missioner is chairman for the two years immediately preceding
time for re-election. Apart from the chairmanship, there is no
significant division of duties among commissioners.
Control of oil and gas production and pipe lines is handled
through the Oil and Gas Division, for whose activities the Com-
mission spends about seventy per cent of its annual funds. The
division had 265 employees in January, 1943, of whom about half
were stationed in Austin, and about half in the offices of the ten
districts. Most staff positions are filled on a political patronage
basis. Commissioners have frankly declared that appointments
are rationed, one-third to each commissioner.5
In 1927, the Colorado Legislature passed an Act forbidding
the waste or wasteful use of natural gas, creating the Colorado
Gas Conservation Commission. Since that time, the Gas Conser-
vation Commission has endeavored to secure the passage of a
better conservation law.6 After many attempts and frustrations,
and being opposed by a strong oil lobby, the gas Conservation Com-
mission, in 1951, finally got the present conservation law enacted. 7
The Act provides for a Commission of five members, four of
whom shall be appointed by the Governor. Those appointed must
have at least five years experience in the production of oil and gas,
and be at least thirty years of age. All members appointed by the
Governor, shall serve for a period of four years without compen-
sation. The fifth member of the Commission is the State Oil In-
spector, who is the only paid member of the Commission. 8
The employees of the Commission vary from time to time,
according to the needs of the Commission. The office staff consists
of two or three secretaries, and the field force consists of one to
three engineers. The employees of the Commission are not picked
on a political patronage basis, as is the case in Texas.
INFORMAL PROCESSES
A very large part of the Railroad Commission's business is
handled without hearings of any kind, formal or informal. The
statute, however, provides that no rule, regulation, or order shall
be adopted by the Commission, except after hearing, upon at least
ten days notice. 9 Nevertheless, hearings are dispensed with in
certain situations.
If the question is whether or not a well has been properly
completed and equipped, the way for the Commission to discover
the facts, is to have its agent examine the well, not to hold a hear-
ing. If the question is whether or not a well should be classified
Kenneth Culp Davis and York Y. Willbern, Administrative Control of Oil
Production in Texas (1944) 22 Texas Law Review 152.
6 Warwick M. Downing, Conservation of Oil Resources-Colorado's Position
Today (1950), Rocky Mountain Law Review, Symposium on Natural Resources
Law.
SColorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951.
'Ibid. See 2.
9Texas Stat. (Vernon, 19.36) art. 6016a.
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as marginal, the way to ascertain the well's productive capacity,
is for the Commission to accept without question, the statements
of the operator, or require the operator to run a production test,
or have the Commission's own engineers run a production test.
In a system of administration of this character, decisions by
the Commission and staff, even where discretion is wide, will natur-
ally or normally be made in many instances without any proceeding
that can be characterized a hearing.
Substantive rights hinge, in large measure, on informal in-
vestigations and inspections of many kinds. The Commission's
engineers in the field may be lenient or strict, fair or unfair. Before
issuance of formal rules, the Commission holds hearings; yet the
operator may be as vitally affected by statements of Commission
policy, in letters to supervisors, concerning the standards they are
to require in the supervision of, say, casing and plugging practices.
From the practical standpoint of getting the Commission's
work done as efficiently as is consistent with private interests, it
is difficult to see how hearings on such matters of administrative
detail could be held.
10
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, provides
that no rule, regulation, or order, or amendment shall be made by
the Commission without a hearing, upon at least ten days notice."
The Colorado Statute wording is very similar to the Texas Statute.
The Conservation Commission has, up to now, strictly ad-
hered to the statutory requirement of a hearing, but it is submitted
that if Colorado becomes a major oil producing state, such as
Texas, the procedure may become burdensome.
THE REQUIREMENT OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
Whether or not a hearing should precede particular adminis-
trative action, depends upon statutory and constitutional require-
ments.
Both the Texas statute and the Colorado statute provide that
"no rule, regulation, or order shall be made by the Commission
without a hearing", with certain exceptions.
Literal interpretation of the term "order", in these statutes,
would be intolerable if not absurd. The statute, thus construed,
would require hearings to precede each "order", the implication
being that no hearing is required when the Commission takes no
action. This requires both too little and too much, for it is probably
the opposite of what good sense would require with respect to
most of the Commission's activities having to do with permits,
certificates of compliance, exemptions and exceptions to rules.
To construe the statutes literally would render them capricious
and unreasonable and that is not what the legislatures could have
intended. So long as the statutes stand, the term "order" should
"0 Kenneth Culp Davis and York Y. Willbern, Administrative Control of Oil
Production in Texas (1944) 22 Texas Law Review 152.
1 Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, See. 8 (b).
DICTA
Mar., 1954
be broadly interpreted to cover the adjudication of all disputes of
fact where the hearing process is the appropriate method for set-
tling the controversy, and the term "order" should be narrowly
construed so as to exclude action which may appropriately rest
upon inspections or examinations or tests, or upon conversations
or correspondence.
Of course, whatever the statute may provide, a party with a
substantial property interest at stake is constitutionally entitled to
hearing on any disputed questions of fact concerning him or his
property which may be appropriately resolved by the process of
hearing testimony or taking other evidence.
12
The Texas statute requiring hearings, expressly provides two
exceptions :13 In emergency situations the Commission can issue
emergency rules, regulations, and orders, but the rule or order
shall remain in effect no longer than fifteen (15) days from its
effective date. The provision for emergency rules is desirable and
wise and has occasionally been invoked by the Commission.
The other exception provides that the Commission may, with-
out prior notice, revoke any rule, regulation, or order promulgated
by it and it may amend any regulation, rule or order, provided the
subject matter of the amendment was considered at the original
hearing. The seeming authorization for revocation or amendment
of rules or orders without hearing is ill-considered and badly
drafted. Revocation of a rule or order may affect private rights
just as seriously as promulgation of a rule or order. For example,
a certificate of compliance permits the production of oil, and the
issuance of a certificate is in the nature of an order. The Commis-
sion is specifically empowered to cancel such a certificate. If the
issuance is an order, the cancellation is a revocation of an order.
But if facts concerning the legality of an operator's acts are dis-
puted, it would be unfair to cancel his certificate without oppor-
tunity for hearing. The provision for amendment of rules or orders
without a hearing seems just as strange. Because of changing
conditions, even though the subject matter of the amendment was
considered in the first hearing, a hearing should be had before the
amendment becomes effective.
Since most matters concerning rules are considered in some
degree at the original hearing, the statute seems to confer a great
deal of liberty to the Commission to change rules without a hearing.
In practice, however, the Commission usually holds hearings be-
fore making significant changes, even when the subject has been
previously considered.
The corresponding provision in the Colorado Oil and Gas Con-
servation Act has been more intelligently drafted. 14 It provides
that the Commission can issue emergency orders without notice
"Kenneth Culp Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the
Administrative Process (1942) 51 Yale L. J. 1093.
Tex. Stat. (Vernon, L936) art. 6036 a.
"Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. 8 (b).
DICTA
Mar., 1954
of hearing, but it does not allow the Commission to revoke any
orders or regulations or amend them without a hearing. It reads,
"No rule, regulation, order, or amendment thereof, shall be made
by the Commission without a hearing . . ." This provision ade-
quately provides for the requirement of opportunity to be heard,
not only where a substantive right is involved, but also where one
may be involved.
TYPES OF HEARINGS
The Railroad Commission properly recognizes that adjudi-
cation is different from rule making and calls for a different pro-
cedure. Adjudication is the determination of controversies be-
tween parties, one of whom may be the Commission. Rule-making
is a distinctive function which consists in formulating regulations
having general application, not limited to named parties.
The procedure pattern for adjudication is that of taking
evidence subject to cross-examination; a rule-making hearing may
properly be nothing more than a mass meeting at which speeches
are made and motions or resolutions are adopted by parliamentary
methods. The most important difference is that in an adjudication,
findings must be based upon evidence in a formal record, so that
full rights of rebuttal, explanation, and cross-examination are pro-
vided, whereas in a rule-making proceeding the tribunal may
properly regard the record of the hearing as only supplementing
information which the tribunal secures elsewhere.1 6
Probably no one within the Commission has specifically ad-
verted to the need for distinctive hearing procedures for adjudi-
cation and for rule-making. It is therefore interesting and signi-
ficant that the Commission, by and large, has intuitively felt the
need for different types of proceedings for the performance of the
different functions, the result being the evolution of two types of
proceedings, often called "statewide hearings" and "special hear-
ings".
STATEWIDE HEARINGS
For adoption of general rules and regulations, field rules,
and monthly proration schedules, so-called statewide or general
hearings are customarily held. They are usually attended by sev-
eral hundred. They are decidedly not like trials but more like
mass meetings or conventions. They serve as a forum at which
any problems of general interest to the oil industry may be con-
sidered.
Although some statewide hearings are called for business
other than proration, most statewide hearings are regular monthly
meetings, in which all matters of general interest may be consid-
ered, but which are devoted primarily to the adoption of proration
schedules.
"Fuchs, Procedure In Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52 Harvard Law
Review 259.
'0 Sometimes denominated quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.
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A mere description of the prominent characteristics of the
statewide hearings should be enough to show that they are not
trials. The purpose is not to make a decision on the record of the
evidence. Statewide hearings are public meetings at which all
points of view may be freely expressed, in order that the Commis-
sion's policies and rules may be guided in part by the desires of
those affected. Speeches made at the meetings are not and ought
not to be considered as evidence. Rules and policies adopted are
not and cannot be supported by substantial evidence, because evi-
dence has to do with questions of fact, and usually the questions
dealt with at the statewide hearings are questions, not of fact,
but of judgment or discretion.
The nature of statewide hearings is too much misunderstood.
Lawyers here and there who are accustomed to courtroom pro-
ceedings seem to think that the forms of the courtroom should be
carried into the statewide hearings.
Rightly understood, the system of statewide hearings is an
outstanding achievement in government. It is fair and efficient.
The proration task is an especially formidable one. The Commis-
sion must fix the state allowable, divide the allowable among the
various fields, and fix the allowable of each well in the various
fields. Yet the Commission has succeeded in developing a procedure
whereby every interest not only has full opportunity to be heard,
but is even positively encouraged to examine and criticize the
Commission's materials and methods.
The system proves that government by bureaucracy can still
be government with the consent of the governed, that is, regula-
tion with the approval and assistance of the regulated.
Since the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act does not
provide for proration, the problem of statewide hearings is not
involved. The statute provides that the Commission shall pre-
scribe rules and regulations governing the practice and procedure
before, it.17 The Commission could, if the necessity arose, carry
on hearings equally as efficient and democratic as the statewide
hearings in Texas.
NOTICE OF HEARINGS
The Texas statute provides that no rule, regulation, or order
shall be adopted except after hearing upon at least ten (10) days
notice given in the manner and form prescribed by the Commis-
sion.18
The chief reliance in letting the public know of statewide
hearings is upon the daily press and trade journals, which are
wholly adequate for that purpose. It is generally known that the
regular proration hearing is held between the 15th and 20th of
each month, and extraordinary statewide hearings are always
featured in the trade news.
" Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. 8 (a).
"Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 6036 a.
Mar., 1954 DICTA
Mar., 1954
Notice of proposals for changes in field rules or in the rules
for an area are sent to all operators in the field or area. If a pro-
posal concerns a single well or wells on a single lease, notice is
sent to all adjoining operators or to all owners or operators for
a considerable distance. Doubts about what parties are entitled
to notice are resolved in favor of giving notice. Announcements
of special hearings are also frequently published as news items.
The Colorado statute assures that adequate notice shall be
given, that is, sufficient notice of the subject matter involved to
enable the party to formulate a defense.
The statute provides that there shall be at least ten (10)
days notice and that notice shall be given either by publication
or by personal ser- ice, and in addition, notice by publication must
be made in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in
which the land is affected. If the Commission decides to give notice
by personal service, the service may be made in the same manner
as that provided for in civil actions in the District Courts of this
state. The notice shall issue in the name of the state, shall be
signed by the Commission, shall specify the time and the place,
and briefly state the purpose of the hearing. In cases of violations
of rules, regulations or orders, notice must be served on the in-
terested parties in the same manner as is provided in the rules of
civil procedure for the service of process in civil actions in the
District Court of this state.19
Any person desiring notification of hearings can file with
the Secretary his name and address and the areas he is interested
in, and receive notice of all hearings relative to his interests.
2 0
PARTIES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
Anyone who cares to do so may participate in the statewide
hearing, even though no interest is shown. Participation in special
hearings is limited to interested parties, although no definition
of this term is given.
Parties are usually represented by attorneys in important
hearings. Some lawyers make a specialty of practice before the
Commission. Attorneys employed by the major companies spend
a large part of their time before the Commission and its exam-
iners. The Commission and its staff express no preference for
representation of parties by attorneys; on the contrary, those
with training or experience in engineering or operating are often
favored.
Since the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission is
not concerned with proration, the problem of who is an interested
party in a statewide hearing is not involved.
11 Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. (c) and (d).
20The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Rules
and Regulations, Rule 517.
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The Commission does state, in its rules of practice and pro-
cedure, certain situations in which a party will be considered an
interested party. 21
The Commission has no preference as to who should represent
parties before it. Heretofore, those appearing before the Commis-
sion have been exclusively represented by lawyers. The Commis-
sion is not interested in who appears as council, so long as the
elements of fair play are complied with.
EXAMINERS
Although the three commissioners usually conduct statewide
hearings, it is very seldom that one commissioner is present at a
special hearing. Occasionally requests are made for rehearing be-
fore the Railroad Commission itself, and such requests are usually
granted.
The usual presiding officers in a special hearing are two exam-
iners of the staff of the Oil and Gas Division. These two examiners
usually hear the cases together. One, a lawyer, presides and ques-
tions witnesses. The other, an engineer, asks some questions and
later assists in the preparation of the examiner's report.
In few cases do examiners make any pre-hearing study or
other preparation, and even then, the amount of effort expended
in advance of the hearing is usually slight. The initiative is usually
supplied by the applicant.
Hearings are quite informal, usually more nearly resembling
round table conferences than trials. Examiners grant or deny
motions or informal requests for postponements or continuances,
entertain objections of procedural points, pass upon admission of
evidence, and otherwise manage the hearing process. The exam-
iners assume the affirmative responsibility of building a complete
and clear record, often asking questions for the sole purpose of
getting answers in the record.
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission does not
make use of trial examiners. The need has not yet arisen.
Three members of the Commission constitute a quorum for
the transaction of business, and for the holding of hearings. '
At the hearing before the Commission, an attorney for the
Commission, and an engineer of the Commission are always present.
There is really no need for the Commission to have their ex-
perts present, since each commissioner is either a lawyer or an
engineer with years of experience.
Most of the witnesses who testify before the Commission are
experts. To save time and operate more efficiently the Commission
assumes that they qualify as experts unless challenged by one of
the parties. To avoid voluminous records, to save money and time,
" The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Rules
and Regulations, Rule 515.
" The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the. State of Colorado, Rules
and Regulations, Rule 520.
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the Commission usually has each expert briefly but concisely state
his position, and the conclusion he has reached. The Commission
recently saved much valuable time by use of this method.
Hearings before the Commission are conducted without rigid
formality.2 3 Emphasis is placed on a fair and speedy hearing.
SUBPOENAS AND PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT
In Texas, subpoena provisions are of little practical impor-
tance, because needed information is almost always either supplied
voluntarily at hearings, or contained in the reports required by
the Commission, or secured by the Commission's almost unlimited
power of inspection.
2 4
The statutory power of the Railroad Commission to "punish
for contempt or disobedience of its orders as the district court
may do" arrests attention. 25 This is contrary to the concept of
separation of powers. Only a judicial officer may commit for
contempt. The general practice throughout the country has been
to provide that administrative agencies may apply to a court for
an order requiring a reluctant witness to testify, disobedience
then being contempt of court.
Although the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act does not
give such sweeping powers as does the Texas statute, it does not
provide the Commission with the power to require the making and
filing of reports and the inspection by the Commission of the
producer's records.
26
The Act also provides the Commission with the power to sum-
mon witnesses and require production of records. Any district
court within the state can compel the witness to attend a hearing
and produce his records. The district court shall have the power
to punish for contempt, for failure to comply with the court's
order.
2 7
As in Texas the provision for subpoena is of little practical
importance since the Commission has in its files almost every
record upon which an issue would be raised.
RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Railroad Commission and its examiners neither apply
or purport to apply the rules of evidence. Any information anyone
wants to offer at a hearing will be admitted, the only limitations
being considerations for relevancy or usefulness and the needless
cluttering of the record. Letting everything in for what it is
worth may have its disadvantages, for records are unduly length-
ened and unreliable information may occasionally influence a
decision.
' Ibid, Rule 519.
2 Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 6008.
2 Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 6024 and 6025.
-' Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. 11.
- Ibid. Sec. 9 (a) and (b).
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The Conservation Commission of Colorado conducts its hear-
ings without rigid formality. In general, the rules of evidence
applicable before a trial court without a jury shall be applicable,
providing that such rules may be relaxed, where, by so doing, the
ends of justice will be better served.
Any person testifying in support of or in opposition to a
rule, petition, or complaint, or motion shall be required to do so
under oath or affirmation. Full opportunity shall be afforded all
interested parties at a hearing to present evidence and to cross-
examine witnesses. 28
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS
Attorneys before the Railroad Commission usually file briefs.
Briefs are considered part of this record. Oral arguments are
made before examiners. A good deal of the testimony is argument.
Little attempt is made to limit argument to facts and to reserve a
time when argument as such may be presented. Arguments, at
whatever stage of the hearings they may be made, form a part of
the record unless they are expressly made off the record.
Usually, there is no oral argument made before the commis-
sioners unless the Commission grants special permission for oral
argument. All hearings before the Colorado Conservation Com-
mission are conducted before at least three commissioners, and
oral argument is permitted. The filing of briefs is encouraged.
TRANSCRIPTS
Most of the records taken before the Railroad Commission
are taken in shorthand, and never transcribed. Records are avail-
able to any parties who are willing to pay the cost of transcribing
them. Whenever the record is not transcribed, the memories and
the notes of the staff members who have attended the hearing
afford the basis for decision.
Proceedings before the Colorado Conservation Commission are
transcribed and made a permanent record. The records are placed
in the Commission's files and are made a matter of public record.
OFFICIAL NOTICE
Just as a court takes judicial notice of what is common knowl-
edge and of general information bearing on questions of law and
policy, so the Commissions take official notice of what to them and
their staffs is common knowledge. One of the purposes of the
administrative process is to gain the advantages of special knowl-
edge and this special knowledge or expertness should be utilized
to the full.
The crucial problem concerning official notice is the extent to
which the Commissions can resort to their files to secure specific
information which is not part of the record of the particular
.' The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Rules
and Reg-ulations, Rules 519 and 521.
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adjudication. In quasi-legislative proceedings, the Commissions
can usually seek information from all sources whatsoever, without
limitations. But in quasi-judicial proceedings there should be an
opportunity for each party to meet and rebut the evidence, and
test it with cross-examination.
The Railroad Commission, in the past, has failed to recognize
the distinction between the two types of hearings and considers
all previous records incorporated in the record before it. In
quasi-judicial proceedings, failure to incorporate the past records
by specific reference, may be a denial of procedural due process
of law because the parties may not have a chance to rebut the
secret evidence used against them.
The Supreme Court of Texas, in the past, has refused to
enforce the requirements of procedural due process and has en-
couraged the Commission in using extra record information.
2 "
That court has held: "It would be placing a useless and intolerable
burden on the Commission to require it to make an appeal proof
record in every instance." Is it useless to give an opposing party
a chance to meet evidence which influences a tribunal to make
an adverse decision? What the Texas court must have had in
mind is that the procedural protection should be afforded at the
judicial stage of a proceeding rather than at the administrative
stage.
One of two alternatives must be chosen to meet the due pro-
cess demands of the Federal Constitution. There must be either
a hearing before the Commission which will assure opportunity
to meet all opposing evidence on disputed questions of fact, or
there must be a completely de novo judicial hearing.
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951 provides
that anybody adversely affected by any rule, regulation, or order
may bring an action against the Commission or the State Oil
Inspector or both.30 The trial shall consider all the evidence-
shall hold a trial de novo-. 3 1
A District Court of Colorado has said, "While it is true that
the proceedings in review must be conducted as a trial de novo,
the issue at the trial de novo is whether or not the orders of the
Commission complained of are valid . . . All the court can say here
is that the orders complained of are valid and should be enforced,
or that they are not valid and should not be enforced . . . The test
to be used by this court is whether or not the evidence before the
court will sustain the orders of the Commission . . .2
It is submitted that if the Commission found disputed facts
from extra record material and the district court found that the
2Cook Drilling Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 139 Tex. 80, 161 S.W. (2d) 1035 (1942).
'o Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1951, Sec. 10 (a).
3, Ibid. Sec. 10 (c).
'2 Sharples Oil Corp., Union Pacific R.R. Co., Texas Co., v. Oil and Gas Con-
servation Commission of the State of Colorado, Phillips Petroleum Co., California
Co., Stanolind Oil and Gas Co.
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evidence would sustain the order of the Commission, there would
be a denial of due process.
Under this system, the aggrieved party never does get a fair
hearing on the merits of his case. He is given no such hearing
before the Commission because he has no chance to rebut the
secret evidence used against him. He gets no hearing on the merits
in the district court, because the court does not decide on the
merits but limits itself to the question of whether or not the evi-
dence before the court will sustain the orders of the Commission.
It should be noted that it is permissible for the Commission
to go beyond the record to get undisputed facts. If this were not
so, it would unduly limit the appropriate scope of official notice.
But it would be a denial of due process for the Commission to find
disputed facts from extra record sources.
EXAMINERS REPORTS
The responsibility for preparing the examiner's report is
primarily that of the examiner who has presided at the hearing,
but the report is by no means that of one individual. At least two
examiners usually collaborate on the report and sign it, but others
who may or may not have been present at the hearing often par-
ticipate. Recommendations on engineering problems are consid-
ered to be those of the engineering department, not those of any
individual.
Intermediate reports should be submitted to the parties. Let-
ting the parties know what materials have come to the attention
of those who make the final decision is of considerable consequence
in satisfying the parties that they have had a fair hearing. One
of the ingredients of many of the Commission's decisions is the
expert judgment of an officer who has not attended the hearing,
and unless an intermediate report is served on the parties, they
may be permanently deprived of opportunity to meet the materials
which become decisive.
The Oil and Gas Conservation Commission does not use trial
examiners. We are therefore not concerned with examiners' re-
ports to the commissioners.
DECISION MAKING
One day each week, the Railroad Commission holds a confer-
ence to make decisions. The Director of Production usually at-
tends, as well as the examiners who heard the case. The group
considers each file as well as the examiners' report, pertinent
exhibits, and sometimes record information.
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission meets
after each hearing to make their decision. The Commission goes
over the evidence and briefs if any have been filed. The commis-
sioners do not have to go over a trial examiner's report because
no trial examiner is used. The findings and order of the Commis-
sion must be unanimous.
DICTA
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CONFERENCES BETWEEN COMMISSIONERS AND PARTIES
It is the general practice of the commissioners to consult
with the parties affected both before and after a hearing. Effec-
tive regulation with the consent and cooperation of the regulated,
demands that the commissioners should maintain contacts with
those affected. The life of the legislative process lies largely in
informal pressures, and that is as true when an administrative
agency is exercising the legislative function as it is when the legis-
lature itself is doing so.
But the Commission should designate which proceedings are
in the nature of adjudications and that with respect to those pro-
ceedings would take great care to refrain from consulting with any
party about the particular case in the absence of opposing parties.
The objective should be to permit, even encourage, informal con-
sultation with parties concerning the Commission's legislative
activities, but at the same time to protect against extra-record
influences when the Commission is performing a judicial function.
To permit a party to an adjudication to talk ex parte to the man
who decides, is to violate the elementary requirements of procedural
fairness.
FINDINGS
The findings of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Com-
mission are in writing and are a matter of public record. The
findings of the Commission must be based on findings of fact .3
There is a strong tendency on the part of state courts, and an
almost universal practice in the Federal Courts, to require that
an order or decision of an agency be accompanied with a statement
by the agency of the mental processes of the agency by which the
evidence was weighed and added up to a finding of ultimate fact.
This requirement is not predicated on any constitutional ground,
but seems rather to be deemed a matter of administrative morality
by the Courts.
34
Whether the Conservation Commission would be required to
give the reasoning behind their findings, in the light of the trial
de novo provision in the conservation act, is questionable.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Colorado's non-political Conservation Commission can prob-
ably operate more fairly and efficiently than can the political
Railroad Commission of Texas.
(2) The term "order" as used in the statute should be construed,
for the sake of efficiency, to exclude reports and engineering
tests.
(3) The provision in the Texas statute for amendment and can-
cellation of rules and orders without a hearing may be a
denial of due process.
"Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of the State of Colorado, Rules and
Regulations, Sec. 8 (b).
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(4) The "statewide" hearing seems to be a very democratic means
for the purpose it serves.
(5) The provision for notice in the Colorado Conservation Act
more than meets every element of notice and adequacy thereof.
(6) The requirement of the Conservation Act that a transcript
of the hearing and the findings of the Commission be made a
matter of public record, makes it easier to determine if the
Commission has used outside evidence on which they based
their findings.
(7) The issues at the trial de novo should not be whether the evi-
dence will support the order of the Commission, but, (1) was
there waste? (thus eliminating the problem of denial of due
process by the Commission's use of secret evidence) and, (2)
Is the Commission's order reasonable?
(8) The requirement that the commissioners must preside at the
hearing more adequately satisfies one that he will get a fair
hearing, and assures that the one who hears will be the one
that decides.
(9) Either the Commission should include more of their reasoning
in their findings or the trial de novo provision of the statute
should be rewritten.
SUPREME COURT WARNS LAWYERS
In Fraka v. Malernee decided by the Colorado Supreme Court
on February 15, 1954, Justice 0. Otto Moore used the following
language which should be carefully noted by every member of
the Bar.
The foregoing facts point out the necessity for this
court to command the attention of members of the bar,
and to sound a warning that failure of a lawyer to ob-
serve and comply with our Rules of Civil Procedure may
result in disaster to the cause of his client.
Because the writ of error in the instant cause must
be dismissed, and for the reason that there seems to be a
growing tendency among members of the bar to believe
that briefs can be filed whenever it is convenient, and that
the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to proceedings before
this court can be ignored or violated without serious con-
sequences, we feel compelled to say that failure to follow
the established -rules of appellate practice may be fatal to
a cause. Our court intends to enforce the Rules of Civil
Procedure, and we solicit the co-operation of members of
the bar, with the firm belief that they will approve an
orderly procedure in appellate practice which can only
be brought about by the observance of the rules which
must govern that practice.
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